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i.e., compulsory or voluntary, where, how long, etc." Should a
court be allowed discretion whether to treat such alcoholics civily
or criminally ?' 3 More general considerations which the General
Assembly, the courts and counsel for chronic alcoholics must face
involve the psychology of an alcoholic34 and the use of alcohol and
its relation to crime generally.3" These questions will have to be met
and solved through legislative action and the adversary system and
it is hoped the articles here cited will be of some help to the legislator and trial advocate in this process.
SAm

G. GRzIMEs

Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech in the Military
On graduation from college Henry Howe was commissioned
as a Second Lieutenant in the U. S. Army Reserve. After being on
active duty about one year he found himself assigned to Fort Bliss
in El Paso, Texas. While he was stationed there, on November 6,
1965, he participated in a demonstration opposing the war in Vietnam. The degree of his protest as well as the fact of his involvement
caused him to be brought before a general court-martial, resulting in
an end to his short military career and his imprisonment for one
year.'
The demonstration was planned and organized by a group of
students and professors from El Paso State College as a protest
"against American policy." The marchers had requested permission from the city council to conduct a side-walk demonstration
82 See, e.g., Deddens, supranote 30; Hutt, Modern Trends in Handling
the
Chronic Court Offender: The Challenge of the Courts, 19 S.C.L. REv. 305,
312-23 (1967); Hutt, Recent Forensic Developments in the Field of Alcoholism, 8 Wm. & MARy L. IREv. 342, 351-58 (1967). Murtagh, Arrests for
Public Intoxication, 35 FoaRRAm L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1966); Myerson and
Mayer, Origins, Treatment and Destiny of Skid Row Men, 19 S.C.L. REv.
332 (1967); Slovenko, supra note 31, at 281-84; Swarty, Compulsory Legal
Measures and the Concept of Illness, 19 S.C.L. Rtv. 372 (1967); Tao, supra
note 31, at 543, 545-47; 16 DE PAUL L. REv. 493, 495 (1967); 1966 DuKE
L.J. 545, 557-61; 52 IowA L. REv. 492, 497-99, 508-10 (1966); 27 LA. L.
REv. 340, 344 (1967); 18 S.C.L. REv. 504, 506-08 (1966); 12 S.D.L. Rtv.
142, 148-50 (1967).
"See, e.g., 12 S.D.L. REv. 142, 150 (1967).
" See, e.g., Murtagh, supra note 32, at 9-10; 18 S.C.L. REv. 504, 505
(1966).
See, e.g., Slovenko, supra note 31, at 271-72.
Court-Martial 413739.
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in San Jacinto Plaza. Permission was initially denied, but on the
advice of the City Attorney who said that there were constitutional
implications in the refusal, the council reversed its decision. For
two weeks prior to the march it had been the subject of a controversy which was intensively reported in all the local news media.
One result of this publicity was a spontaneous counter-demonstration. The marchers were met by a crowd of about 2,000 whose
attitude is best symbolized by those who wore "Win in Vietnam"
stickers pasted to their foreheads and by the American Legionaires
who passed out small United States flags. The group itself consisted of twelve demonstrators carrying signs reading: "Let's get
out of Vietnam," "Get out of Vietnam," "Peace in Vietnam," and
"Would Jesus carry a draft card."2 Lt. Howe was not a member
of the group that planned the demonstration, only joining the march
as it began. As the marchers started moving, he fell in at the rear,
displaying a sign which previously he had been carrying rolled in
his hand. As he walked he reversed the sign occasionally so both
sides could be seen. The front of the sign read, "Let's have more
than a choice between petty ignorant Fascists in 1968."' The re'4
verse exhorted, "End Johnson's Fascist aggression in Vietnam."
Lt. Howe was not in uniform at the time of his participation in
the demonstration.'
The Lieutenant was convicted by a general court-martial' of
violations of articles 88 and 133 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 7 entitled "Contempt Towards Officials"' and "Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman" 9 respectively. He was sen2 United States v. Howe,
17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 168, 37 C.M.R. 429, 432
(1967).
'Id.
'Id.
'United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 555, 556 (1966).
'This is one of the types of courts-martial which are classified in order of
formality and power to try and punish offenses. The three classifications are,
from least to most comprehensive: summary, special and general courtsmartial.
, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1966). [hereinafter
cited as U.C.M.J.].

'U.S.C. § 888 (1964).
'10 U.S.C. § 933 (1964). Although this article seems to tread dangerously

close to the line of unconstitutionality for vagueness, as was argued to the
court, a discussion of it is outside the scope of this note. Violations of this
article are rarely, if ever, prosecuted except in concert with another article
as was done in Hozve,
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tenced to dismissal" and confinement at hard labor for two years1
with total forfeitures. After the case went through the normal
automatic review process, Lt. Howe's petition to the United States
Court of Military Appeals to review his conviction was denied.
A petition for reconsideration of the refusal to grant discretionary
review was also denied. The court handed down a lengthy opinion,
in United States v. Howe,' 2 giving the reasons for denial of the
latter petition.
The unanimous opinion of the court lists seven arguments"3 pre1

oEquivalent to a dishonorable discharge.
The sentence was reduced by the convening authority (the officer in
Command with the authority to convene a court marital and first reviewing
authority) to one year. Lt. Howe was released under commandant's parole
three months and two days after his trial.
1 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967). It should be pointed out
that under Article 76 of the U.C.M.J. this is Lt. Howe's last direct appeal.
10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964). This article provides that after the review procedures required by the U.C.M.J. are completed, "Orders publishing the
proceedings of courts-marital and all action taken pursuant to such proceedings shall be binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of
the United States... ." Id. The result is that the Supreme Court does not
exercise supervision over the military judicial system, and its doctrines and
interpretations are not binding on the military as they are on civilian courts.
Thus the product of the military judicial system can only be attacked collaterally in a habeas corpus proceeding and then only on limited grounds.
See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
13 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 169, 37 C.M.R. at 433. The arguments listed are
these:
1. The charges against appellant violate the First Amendment to the
to the Constitution.
2. Articles 88 and 133 are so vague and uncertain that they violate the
Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
3. The charge under Article 133 fails to state an offense.
4. The law officer erred to the substantial prejudice of the appellant
in failing to instruct, sua sponte, that if the court-martial found the
allegedly contemptuous words to have been uttered in the course of
a political discussion, then it had to find that appellant intended
them to be personally disrespectful.
5. Appellant was substantially prejudiced by the law officer's ruling
that the maximum sentence for the charged offenses included confinement at hard labor for three years.
6. The law officer erred to the substantial prejudice of the appellant
by instructing the court-martial, over defense objections, that in determining whether the words uttered by appellant were contemptuous of the President the court-martial "should apply the test
of how the words were understood and what they were taken to
mean by the persons who saw them, or some of them."
7. The appellant was prejudiced in his appeal before the board of
review by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Hagopian's participation in the
oral argument and decision of the instant case.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

sented to it for consideration, three of which are relevant here.14
These three points were directed at the validity of the prosecution
under article 88 of the U.C.M.J.15 Entitled "Contempt Towards
Officials," the Article reads as follows:
Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against
the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary
of the Treasury, or the Governor, or legislature of any State,
Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty
or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 16
The major issue in Howe was the validity of article 88 under the
first amendment. Also assigned as error was the ruling by the law
officer that, if the court-martial board found the words to have been
uttered in the course of a political discussion, then it must find that
Lt. Howe intended them to be personally disrespectful.17 Another
ground urged was based on the test the court-martial was to use in
the determination of whether the words were contemptuous. The
standard used was, "How the words were understood and what they
18
were taken to mean by persons who saw them, or some of them."
Over half of the opinion is devoted to the constitutional issues
raised by these charges. The court's holding that article 88 does
not violate the first amendment is supported by two arguments. The
first consists of an historical exposition of the article and its antecedents going back to the period preceding the founding of the Republic. This chronicle points out that a predecessor to this statute
constituted a contemporary construction of the Constitution, i.e.,
a similar law was passed when many of the framers of the first
amendment were still in Congress.
The fundamental basis for the court's decision, however, is found
in a comparatively short paragraph which states:
The evil which Article 88 of the Uniform Code, supra, seeks to
avoid is the impairment of discipline and the promotion of
insubordination by an officer of the military service in using

1

See arguments 1, 4, and 6, note 13 supra.
10 U.S.C. § 888 (1964).

1T

d.

The discussion in the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 1951, 1 167 specifically exempts political speech from the operation of Article 88. See U.S.
DEP'T oF DEFFNsE, MANUAL FOR COURT MARTIAL 1951, 1 167 (1951).

" United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 169, 37 C.M.R. 429, 433
(1967).
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contemptuous words towards the Chief of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Forces of the United
States. 19
Taking judicial notice of the conflict in Vietnam and the demands
it is placing on our armed forces, the court goes on to say, "That in
the present times and circumstances such conduct by an officer constitutes a clear and present danger to discipline within our armed
services, under the precedents established by the Supreme Court,
seems to require no argument."20
The other two assignments of error were also rejected by the
court. The argument questioning the standard to be applied in determining contemptuousness failed as immaterial since the words
were "obviously contemptuous per se."2 1 Similarly, the court refused to confer a privilege for political discussion, stating that intent
was not an element of the article.22
The thesis of this note is that New York Times Company v.
Sullivan,23 a case mentioned only briefly by the court in Howe, should
control the general problem of military free speech there encountered; and that the "clear and present danger" test 24 -which may
have no validity at all after the Times case 25-was too loosely used
in the area of seditious libel, to which it should have no relevancy.2
The opinion in Times gave an unequivocal answer as to the status
of seditious libel under the Constitution. In ruling the Sedition Act
of 17987 unconstitutional and thereby eliminating the concept of
seditious libel from the vocabulary of the law the Supreme Court
created an important test for interpretation of the first amendment.28 The Times case declared as unconstitutional the use by government of any form of seditious libel to suppress speech. Since
article 88 as here interpreted by the Court of Military Appeals is
1
Id. at 173, 37 C.M.R. at 437.
0
d. at 174, 37 C.M.R. at 437.
21 Id. at 181, 37 C.M.R. at 445.
22
Id. at 180, 37 C.M.R. at 444.
22376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2
See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
" Kalven, The New York Times Case, 1964 SUPREME CoURT REVIEW
191 20(1964).
See note 78 infra, and accompanying text
"Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
2
Kalven, supra note 25. Professor Kalven may be one of the few commentators who sees these implications in Times. The Times case arose in
tort and is, of course, open to a strict interpretation limiting it to that field.
But see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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capable of being applied as a seditious libel statute, it may have
been unconstitutionally applied in the Howe case, because the standards set out in Times were arguably not met. All of this, of course,
is based on the assumption that the first amendment applies to the
military, a question which the court never squarely faced.
Although the Times case arguably was not aimed solely at seditious libel,2" its impact on that aspect of the first amendment is
significant and can best be understood by defining seditious libel
and outlining two theories relating to its status that emerged prior
to the Times case. To define seditious libel is difficult, and perhaps
the best definition is one that has been pieced together from actual
prosecutions.
The crime consisted of criticizing government: its form, constitution, officers, laws, symbols, conduct, policies, and so on. In
effect, any comment about government which could be construed
to have the bad tendency of lowering it in the public esteem or
of disturbing the peace was seditious libel, subjecting the speaker
or writer to criminal prosecution. 0
Prior to the Times opinion at least two theories emerged as to
the status of seditious libel at the time of ratification of the first
amendment. One argument, generally accepted by the courts since
Justice Holmes wrote his opinion in Schenck v. United States,"'
argues that the amendment nullified the common law of sedition. A
revisionist view contends that the authors of the amendment left the
common law crime of seditious libel in force.3 2 The conflict between
these two theories is largely academic, however, when viewed in the
light of Times. There the court acknowledged the existence of the
two schools of thought, but held that the Sedition Act of 179833 was
unconstitutional:
Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the
attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history ....

These views reflect a broad consensus that the act, be-

:'See note 28 supra.
*L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH
TORY: LEGACY OF SuPPREssIoN

AND PRESs IN EARLY AMERICAN His-

10 (1960). Since the trial of John Peter

Zenger, truth has been recognized as a defense. This can be of dubious
value since the jury must pass on the truth or falsity of sometimes unpopular ideas.
81249 U.S. 47 (1919).
2 3L. LEvY, supra note 30.

Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
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cause of the restraint imposed upon criticism of government and
public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment. 34
Thus the Times case, which addressed itself at least in part to
the question of seditious libel, was perhaps a significant breakthrough in the interpretation of the first amendment. It has been
noted that, "The exciting possibilities in the court's opinion derive
from its emphases on seditious libel and the Sedition Act of 1798
as the key to the meaning of the First Amendment."3 6 By this
opinion, it is argued, the court has marked out the central meaning of
the first amendment. As a result, Professor Kalven feels that the
court has implicitly abandoned some of the tests used earlier, notably
the "clear and present danger" test. Hence it is possible that the
court in Howe has applied outdated law. A clear statement of
policy regarding the attitude toward seditious libel appears in
Times:
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound
national committment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. 36
Times, in voicing previous dissatisfaction with the court's handling
of first amendment problems, 3 7 seems to represent a shift toward
absolutist theories in the area of political speech.3
The proposition supported by Times as to seditious libel in
civil suits is reaffirmed and extended to criminal prosecutions by
Garrison v. Louisiana." In that case public statements by New
Orleans District Attorney, Jim Garrison, attributed a huge backlog
of cases in the criminal district court to excessive vacations by the
judges. He further accused these judges of hampering enforcement
of vice laws by their refusal to authorize expenses for necessary
investigations. These assertions caused his conviction under the
Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute.4 0 The Supreme Court
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
" Kalven, supra note 25, at 204.
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
"7See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
" See generaUy A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CoNSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
"379 U.S. 64 (1964).
"LA.

REV. STAT.

§ 14:47 (1950).
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reversed, holding that this was a type of seditious libel prosecution
held unconstitutional in Times. 41 The court said,
The reasons which led us so to hold in New York Times ...
apply with no less force merely because the remedy is criminal.
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression compel
42
application of the same standard to the criminal remedy.
It remains to be seen, of course, whether the language of article
88 enables it to be applied as a seditious libel statute in a manner
proscribed by Times. A brief description of the article and its history is necessary. The statute has its origins in the Articles of War
of Gustavus Adolphus,4" the form of the offense being disrespect
towards the Royal Person or Family. The British Articles of War
of 1765 contained a similar provision. 4 In 1776 the American
Articles of War added the clause in a modified form to suit the
needs of the democracy. It was an offense to be disrespectful towards
"the authority of the United States in Congress assembled or the
legislature of any of the United States. ' 41 Periodically, until 1950,
additions were made to the list of persons and institutions protected.
Professor Morgan of Harvard Law School, who headed the committee which drafted the U.C.M.J., tried to have the article stricken
from the new code but failed.4 6
In 1956 Article 88 was amended by Congress. Though a very
minor change of phraseology, this revision had the effect of narrowing the scope of the statute. The phrase "Secretary of a military
department" was substituted for "Secretary of a department." The
effect was to exclude some of the officials who have absolutely no
relation to the military. This may have been a recognition of the
overinclusiveness of this statute, in that formerly more officials were
4'

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964).

"Id. at 74.
"J. SNEDEKER, MILITARY JUSTICE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 751
(1953).
"Id.
"Id. at 752.
"Hearings on S. 857 and H.R. 4080 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate

Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 330 (1949). Those who
fought to retain the provision had their arguments summed up well by
Senator Saltonstall: "I hate to see a fellow called out on a Saturday night
and say everything against his government, and then on Monday morning he
appears in uniform with a great smile on his face and squared-up shoulders." Id. at 332.
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covered them were necessary to achieve the purpose of the article.'
The elements of the offense under article 88 are those obvious in
the statement of the statutory language. 48 The accused must have
been a commissioned officer and must have used contemptuous words
towards an official or institution specified in the article. He must,
at the time of the offense, have had a wrongful intent.4 9 Guidance
50
for use of article 88 is included in the Manual For Courts Martial.
The discussion lists exceptions to the statute and matters in aggravation. Criticism of protected officials or groups in the course of a
political discussion is excluded from the operation of the statute.
This exemption applies even though the words are emphatically
expressed, unless they are personally contemptuous. Giving broad
circulation to a written publication, or the utterance of such language in the presence of military inferiors, both serve to aggravate
the offense. Further, truth or falsity may be immaterial, since the
gist of the offense is the contemptuous and malicious quality of the
words employed.51
A comparison of article 88 of the U.C.M.J. and the Sedition
Act of 1798, declared unconstitutional by Times, points out the similarity of the two statutes. After condemning conspiracy against the
laws, institutions or officers of the United States, the Sedition Act,
in section two, prohibits seditious libel:
And be it further enacted, that if any person shall write, print,
utter or publish or shall cause to be written, printed, or published, or shall knowingly and willfully assist or aid in writing,
printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United
States or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the
President of the United States with the intent to defame said
government, or either house of said congress, or the said President or to bring them, or either of them into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them or either or any of them, the
hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite against them or any of
them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to
'" See note 19 supra and accompanying text. The article may still be
overinclusive by virtue of the state officials retained.
,8 See note 17, supra, and accompanying text.
J. SNEDEKER, spra note 43, at 752.
J'
U.S. DEP'T OF DEiENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL 1951,
167
(1951). Manual published to implement the U.C.M.J.

a'Id.
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excite any unlawful combination therein, for opposing or resisting
any law of the United States or any act of the President done in
pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested by the
constitution of the United States or to resist, oppose, or defeat any
such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile designs of
any foreign nation against the United States, their people or government, then such person, being thereof convicted before any
court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars, and by im2
prisonment not exceeding two years.5
Section three of the Act allows truth as a defense without elaborating its value and makes truth a jury question. The fourth and
final section provides for the expiration of the act on March 3,
1801.
The language of this act53 should be compared with that of
article 88 punishing contemptuous words against the President,
Congress and various other officials and institutions of government. The phrase "any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous
words . . . ,," has the same ring as "or to bring them or either of
them into contempt or disrepute."" In both cases the wording seems
to be the same in purpose and effect.
The proposition that Times precludes the application of article
88 to Lt. Howe, however, depends ultimately on whether the first
amendment applies to the military. Even if applicable, the first
amendment need not be an absolute as to the military, nor must it
apply in the same measure as it does to civilians. There are compelling reasons for limiting some types of speech in the military.
The most frequently raised, and the most justified, is the need to
protect national security. Material and information vital to the
"2Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
5aSee also the Espionage Act, as amended in May 1918, ch. 75, § 1, 40
Stat. 553 which continues this type of suppression-now with the excuse
of wartime necessity:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully, utter,
print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive
language about the form of government of the United States, or the
Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of
the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the Uniform
of the Army or Navy of the United States, or any language intended
to bring [these] . . . into contempt, scorn, or contumely or disrepute
Id. *•.. shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000.
5110 U.S.C. § 888 (1964).
"Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
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national defense must be protected from disclosure. This necessarily requires that speech which would divulge such information be
suppressed. The need to maintain discipline, and the position of
the military in policy formulation, are the less clear-cut areas where
some regulation is required. The military must have discipline to
carry out its function; it must be able to command unquestioning
obedience at the proper time. How much of a limitation on speech is
required to insure this response is the problem at the core of the
Howe decision. Certainly the army is justified in prosecuting a
soldier who curses his company commander. On the other hand,
the soldier who merely complains about army life should not be prosecuted. As usual, the line where speech limitation becomes questionable lies somewhere between these extremes.
In the area of national policy formulation there are at least two
facets to the problem. The officer who speaks to influence decisions
on policy matters by either his military or civilian superiors or in
violation of a determination already made forms one aspect of the
difficulty. The other is the officer whose words are taken by his
listeners to be reflective of policy despite his assertions to the contrary. Some regulation is required in this area to avoid jeopardizing
civilian control of the military. However, there should be proof
of specific necessity before basic freedoms are limited."6
There is some indication, from both case authority and the Constitution itself, that constitutional protections are intended to cover
the military. Even in the Howe decision some support for this
proposition can be found. The opinion is primarily devoted to the
constitutional issues raised-on the assumption that the first amendment applies to the military.17 Moreover, the court bases its holding,
at least in part, on the clear and present danger test,5" an unnecessary
gesture if the first amendment is inapplicable to the military.
" As Chief Justice Warren has said, "a most extraordinary showing
of military necessity in defense of the Nation has been required for the
Court to conclude that the challenged actions in fact squared with the injunctions of the Constitution." Warren, The BiU of Rights and the Military,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 197 (1962).
" An analogous situation may be seen in cases involving state governmental action and the first amendment, where the court no longer feels
compelled to say that the first amendment is made applicable to the states
by the fourteenth. Compare Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925),
with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
8 See note 20 supra, and accompanying text.
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The fifth amendment guarantee of indictment by grand jury
specifically excludes the military from its coverage. 9 That none
of the other amendments contain such an exclusion would indicate
that amendments not so qualified do apply to the armed services.00
In the second 61 and third62 amendments the framers indicate a distrust of standing armies and an intention that military requirements
should be fulfilled by citizen soldiers whose rights would be as nearly
equal to those of their civilian counterparts as possible. Further, there
is no reason to assume that the grant of power to Congress, "To
make rules for the government and regulation of the Land and
Naval forces,"0 3 permits it to exceed the limitations of the Bill
of Rights. This combination of powers and limitations was emphasized in a speech by Justice Black. "It seems obvious to me that
Congress in exercising its general powers, is expressly forbidden
to use means prohibited by the Bill of Rights."6 4 Another possible
argument is that the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
which is applicable to the military, includes the right not to have freedom of speech abridged.
Case law, either military or civilian, applying the first amendment to the armed forces is rare. A military decision on point is
United States v. Voorhees,6 in which an army officer was accused
of submitting a manuscript to a publisher without prior clearance of
the contents, a violation of army regulations. This case, in which
all three judges filed opinions, only brushed the constitutional issue.
By straining the interpretation of the regulation's phrase "policy
and proprietary considerations" to be the equivalent of security
considerations, the court was able to bring the regulation within
acceptable limitations on speech. The opinion did make a point of
expressing the court's position on the first amendment rights of the
military: "I think I should make it clear that in my opinion every
individual in the military is entitled to the same constitutional rights,
privileges and guarantees as every other American citizen, except
"U.S.

CONST. amend. V.

(OCf. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), extending this exclusion to
the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by jury.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
'2 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
:. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
'Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 875 (1960).
"4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1953).
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where specifically denied or limited by the Constitution itself." '
The majority and the dissenting opinions found a common ground
on this point, with the dissent pointing out: "Even as to service personnel, I deem applicable to a partial-even to a substantial--extent
the doctrine of the Supreme Court that the rights deriving from
the first amendment are to be jealously safeguarded by the judiciary
this regardless of whether they may be said to enjoy a 'preferred

position.'

"67

Civilian courts have generally declined to interfere in the administration of justice within the military itself. This partially explains the dearth of cases applying the Constitution to members of
the armed forces. The civilian courts have enforced the due process
rights of the military, however. Burns v. Wilson" stands as the
leading case on civilian review of court-martial proceedings. This
review is limited to collateral attack on very restricted grounds. The
court emphasized the application of constitutional principles: "The
military courts, like the state courts, have the same responsibilities
as do the federal courts to protect a person from a violation of his
Constitutional Rights." 9 United States v. Hiatt,79 an earlier Third
Circuit opinion still cited by courts with approval, also supports the
due process rights of the military. "We think that this basic guarantee of fairness afforded by the due process clause of the fifth amendment applies to a defendant in criminal proceedings in a federal
military court as well as in a federal civil court."71 Thus at a
minimum the due process rights of the military are protected by the
Constitution, and although military due process does not embody
quite the same privileges,72 it does have a constitutional basis.
Whatever the status of the military under the Bill of Rights,
it would seem invalid, once the application of a specific right has
been accepted, to limit the scope of that right indiscriminately and
without a compelling reason for the precise limitation involved.
This occurred in the Howe case when the court made its only significant reference to Times: "[T]he search for the outer limits of
00 Id. at 531, 16 C.M.R. at 105.
67 Id. at 545, 16 C.M.R. at 119.
"346 U.S. 137 (1953).
"Id. at 142.
141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944).
'Id. at 666.
" W. Aycocic & S. WUErEL, MILITARY LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE
OF MILITARY JUSTICE 187 (1955).
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that right [freedom of speech] ... has, in the main, been restricted
to the civilian and not the military community. '7 3 Such a blind,
sweeping restriction of the application of the Times case seems unwarranted; some compelling justification must be advanced in any
given situation.
Indeed, there are policy reasons why protection should be extended to the military. The first amendment, more than any other,
stands as an end in itself. Many provisions of the Bill of Rights
are designed to insure an accused a fair trial, but few taken alone
could be called as definitive of a democratic society as the first amendment. Suppression of speech will tend to discourage critical thought
and debate on public issues. It follows that an ambivalent feeling
toward current affairs will prevail among people not allowed to express their opinions. This has grave implications in an age where a
military career requires increasing political astuteness and sophistication. This can only have the effect of encouraging mediocrity in
the military. Conscription points up another argument. Although
officers are not directly effected by the draft, many officers would not
have volunteered had they not been faced with the draft as an alternative. Thus, an argument that an officer is in service by choice
and has waived his rights may not be as strong as it might
seem. Still another consideration is the number of people affected. In a time of high mobilization the size of the military
can run to several millions. Thus a large segment of the population
is potentially deprived of its first amendment rights. A final point
is the effect of the loss of these rights on the exercise of the franchise. Without being able to participate in the political process in
an active way the right to vote can, for some, appear an empty formality.
There are several arguments against military free speech. The
maintenance of civilian control of the armed forces by keeping the
military out of politics is one. This has special appeal in an hemi74
sphere where military involvement in government is a fact of life.
" United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 177, 37 C.M.R. 429, 441

(1967).

" These arguments raise questions about the degree of civilian control

necessary to effectuate the purposes of that control. This dominance seems
to have been, if anything, increasing since the creation of the Department of
Defense in 1947. Secretary Robert S. McNamara represented this trend,
being the strongest Secretary of Defense to date. The Court of Military
Appeals refused to make an exception in Lt. Howe's case because of the
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This argument is based on a form of discipline, i.e., the need for the
military to be subservient to civilian control. It is true that there
cannot be a double standard of discipline, one for wartime and another in peace. It is also a fact that unquestioning obedience is a
pre-eminent requirement for the military to be an effective instrument. This is particularly high-lighted by the fact that the military
is a tool of national policy and not a maker of that policy. What
effect does a law like article 88 have in effectuating these goals of
civilian control ?7 To justify this statute the question must be
answered convincingly.
These arguments for application of the first amendment to the
military establishment, when joined with Times' invalidation of the
concept of seditious libel and the similarity between this concept
and article 88 of the U.C.M.J., permit the contention that article 88
was unconstitutionally applied in the Howe case. This is not to say
that the article is unconstitutional per se, but rather that standards
laid down in the Times opinion must be satisfied to avoid the label
of seditious libel which will be equated with unconstitutionality.
The rule announced by the Times case, "prohibits a public official
from recovering for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."7 6 The argument that there
might be a separate standard in criminal cases is rebutted by Garrison v. Louisiana.
When measured by the Times standard, Lt. Howe's actions appear to fall within the scope of the first amendment protection defined by that case. The statements undoubtedly refer to a public
official, the President. They are critical of official conduct, the
Vietnam conflict. In a determination of actual malice the real question here posed under the Times test is whether advocacy of a
implications it might have for "the man on the white horse." United States
v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 175, 37 C.M.R. 429, 439 (1967). This seems
to be less than justified, given the strength of the concept of civilian control
of the military.
"'The Navy has traditionally used less formal means to accomplish its
objectives in this area. A recent example can be found in the case of Capt.
Richard Alexander, U.S.N., who was reassigned from command of the
battleship New Jersey as a result of his public statements. New York Times,
Jan. 9, 1968, at 1, Col. 2.
"' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
77 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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legitimately held political belief, no matter what its basis, is to be
equated with knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. In any
case, the test for malice is a subjective one and not the objective
standard applied by the court.
There are, of course, counter-arguments which may be advanced
under the Times standard. It is arguable that Lt. Howe's acts were
personally contemptuous of the President rather than critical of his
official conduct. There is some basis for the contention that the
term "Fascist" is of such a nature as not to be applied except knowingly or at least recklessly as to its falsehood.
In addition to the court's failure to apply the Times test in Howe,
it arguably misapplies the "clear and present danger" test to justify
its holding. Aside from questions raised about the current soundness
of the test and about the present status of the test in the courts,"8 it
is doubtful that the facts of this case meet the standards intended by
its authors. Justices Holmes and Brandeis eschewed what has become known as the "bad tendency" test"0 and insisted that the danger
of a substantive evil which Congress has a right to prevent be both
clear and immediate.8 0 In Howe the court did not even feel compelled to justify its use of the "clear and present danger" test. The
danger cited by the court is prejudice to the good order and discipline
of the military."1 It would appear that civilians engaged in similar
protests present only slightly less of an evil. This is especially true
since Lt. Howe was virtually indistinguishable from a civilian. However, if this type of statute were applied to civilians it would be
clearly unconstitutional.
It may be said that this type of restriction involves a minimal
loss of freedom of speech, and that the contemptuous language contemplated by the article is not a necessary adjunct to meaningful
political activity. The principle, however, remains the same. These
rights have always been jealously guarded and even minor encroachments have been corrected because of their implications of increasingly large sacrifices of freedom. Therefore, Lt. Howe's conviction
should have been reversed due to the unconstitutional application of
article 88. "It is anomalous that one who enters the armed forces is
78

Kalven, supra note 25, at 214.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
"'But see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
" See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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performing his greatest role as a citizen and yet is reduced to a
status where he can no longer enjoy the rights which protect his
civilian counterpart.

'2
1

THOMAS

C. NoRD

Corporations-Reserved Powers and Fundamental Corporate
Changes-Protection of Minority Stockholders' Interests

In the recent decision of Brundage v. The New Jersey Zinc Company,' the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a corporate merger
approved by two-thirds of the stockholders of the corporation. The
merger was effected pursuant to a state statute which was enacted
subsequent to New Jersey Zinc's incorporation, 3 but which nevertheless was applicable to New Jersey Zinc under the statutory reservation of powers of the state. This reservation, subjecting corporate
charters to "alteration, suspension and repeal" in the discretion
of the legislature, 4 was contained in the corporation act under which
New Jersey Zinc was chartered. In allowing less than all of the
stockholders to validate this fundamental corporate change, the court
disavowed the longstanding precedent of Zabriskie v. Hackensack
& New York Railroad Company.5
In Zabriskie, a railroad sought to extend its line beyond that allowed in its original charter under the authority of a legislative enactment amending the charter to allow the extension. The court
held that this action could not be taken even though only a single
stockholder dissented, since the reserved powers could not be used
to validate corporate changes affecting the stockholders' interest
without unanimous consent. It applied the reasoning of the English
case of Natusch v. Irving,' which held that a joint stock company
formed to sell life insurance could not undertake to sell marine insurance-an activity which was unlawful when the company was
formed, but which Parliamentary statute subsequently made law"2Pearl, The Applicability of the Bill of Rights to a Court Martial Proceedings, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 561, 565 (1960).
148

'N.J.

N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585 (1967).
STAT. ANN. § 14:12-1 (Supp. 1967).

'The New Jersey Zinc Co. received its charter in 1880.
"Ch. 67 [1875] N.J. Laws (now N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14-1 (1937)).
'13 N.J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867).
'47 Eng. Rep. 1196 (Ch. 1824).

